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Abstract—Machine learning techniques are finding many ap-
plications in computer systems, including many tasks that re-
quire decision making: network optimization, quality of service
assurance, and security. We believe machine learning systems are
here to stay, and to materialize on their potential we advocate
a fresh look at various key issues that need further attention,
including security as a requirement and system complexity, and
how machine learning systems affect them. We also discuss
reproducibility as a key requirement for sustainable machine
learning systems, and leads to pursuing it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, machine learning has grown as
scientific and perhaps independent discipline for the study of
statistical models that can help in performing tasks, such as
classification, without relying on explicitly defined rules, and
rather on patterns and inferences made from data used for
building those “data models”. For example, samples of data
are typically used in machine learning algorithms to build a
model in a process called “model training”, which (the model)
then is used for making decisions concerning samples of the
same type as those used in building the model.
The applications of machine learning in computer and
networked systems are ubiquitous, with hundreds of appli-
cations and thousands of publications emerging every year.
Those applications include areas of computer networks and
simulation [1], pattern recognition [2], general designs [3],
data quality assurance [4], attack detection and security en-
hancement [5], [6], [7], [8], network and computer systems
optimization through forecasting and classification [9], user
behavior analysis for prioritization and optimization [10], [11],
among many others. Machine learning techniques, including
shallow and deep learning, have been widely utilized to prob-
lems in the computer and networked systems space, covering
fundamental problems such as congestion control [12], traffic
management [13], resource management [14], and quality of
service (QoS) management and assurance [15].
Some might argue that the use of machine learning in many
of those applications is unjustifiable, as is becoming apparent
in various of our community gatherings, arguing that the use
of machine learning is driven by the general hype surrounding
an emerging research area, and perhaps other alternatives and
existing approaches should be utilized, including model-based
(but not learning) algorithms that have been widely utilized
and shown to provide good results in the literature. Some
others have painted a different reality: machine learning is
the only approach ahead for most if not all problems.
In this paper, we take a middle ground: machine learning is
here to stay, and machine learning applications in many com-
puter systems in general and networked systems in particular
are perhaps justified, important, and necessary. However, in
order for a meaningful use of machine learning in this area
to materialize, various problems are certain, and addressing
those problems as a first step requires a significant attention
and effort from the community. More so, those problems
require a fresh look, for that they are forever new with the
particulars of machine learning systems. To instantiate our
position, we consider three dimensions: security, complexity,
and reproducibility. We highlight facets of those dimensions
that require attention so that the introduction, integration, and
utilization of machine learning algorithms into computer and
networked systems are useful and usable.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In section II, we address security of machine learning systems.
In section III, we discuss various issues with the inherent
complexity of machine learning systems, and how they might
affect the operation of computer systems. In section IV we
draw attention to reproducibility, a central issue affecting the
sustainability of this domain and our views on how to partly
address it. Section V has concluding remarks.
II. SECURITY IS NOT A FEATURE
For long time, security and privacy have been considered
as a feature, and not as a core computer system requirement,
except when the computer system itself is built around security
(e.g., authentication systems). For example, in networked
systems, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are still
prevalent today [16], [17] in great part because the Internet
was first designed in principle as a medium of communication
between endpoints, taking into account the reliability of the
communication, and without any consideration for source
authentication. It was envisioned back then that security would
be addressed at the application layer, or incrementally by
employing upgrades to existing protocols.
A. Time for Experiential Learning: A Prologue
The past 30 years are a testimony of the failure of this argu-
ment. With a few exceptions, upgrades to insecure protocols,
such as IP, DNS, and BGP, to add security features through
alternatives, such as IPSec, DNSSEC, and BGPSec, have
been fiercely resisted for many reasons, including overhead
(e.g., computation overhead for signature verification) and trust
(e.g., key certification). Where those new upgrades are not
resisted, the shift to utilizing them has been very slow for
the lack of incentives: utilizing those protocols in some cases
means utilizing new stacks of hardware, by replacing existing
infrastructure, which is quite expensive, with very little return
if such upgrades are to be done eventually.
Although not clearly visible yet, we expect the same sce-
nario to repeat itself with machine learning algorithms being
advocated today for every application. A natural question that
might become apparent in this context is the following: why
would we need to have security measures and an understanding
of the security capabilities of a machine learning algorithm
employed in a non-security application, e.g., resource man-
agement, queuing, quality of service, etc.? In other words,
what are the faces of similarity, if any, between machine
learning algorithms employed in computer systems and those
of Internet protocols? The answer is multi-fold.
First, while not apparent, security–broadly defined–is ar-
guably part of those applications’ basic guarantees. For exam-
ple, one possible expected non-security guarantee of certain
queuing algorithms is fairness. Allowing such an algorithm
through machine learning to efficiently and reliably ensure
fairness, while not explicitly stated as a security requirement,
as a core security requirement. Having a secure machine
learning algorithm, where the operating of the algorithm will
help ensure the final outcome of the application in which it is
employed, is essentially a requirement, not a feature.
Second, we believe that machine learning needs to be
viewed as part of the systems in which they are employed,
and not as a stand-alone and separate component that does
not influence the system. That is in fact the modus operandi
in many systems and their design utilizing machine learning.
To that end, a simple modification in the machine learning
algorithm might affect the performance of the system, causing,
among other outcomes, a violation of the very basic guarantees
of overall computer system. As demonstrated in the machine
learning literature, this change can be in the algorithm itself
or the input to the algorithm. Eventually, machine learning
algorithms are implemented as a software; e.g., as in the
widely used machine learning libraries, such as TensorFlow,
Keras, Theano, PyTorch, and Pandas, among many others.
Modifying the algorithms could be as simple as exploiting a
vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow). Worse yet, machine learn-
ing algorithms are prone to adversarial examples: examples
are are not necessarily out of the training dataset, but that
once are slightly modified (or perturbed) they could be used
to cause misclassification by the machine learning algorithm
(e.g., labeling a malicious sample as benign).
Third, the community has been advocating translating ma-
chine learning algorithms used in systems into hardware for
performance reasons. Implementing those algorithms in hard-
ware, without having a clear understanding of their security
properties, nor of their resilience to manipulated input will
eventually raise the cost of reversal: employing a more secure
machine learning algorithm will require replacing the hard-
ware implementation of insecure machine learning algorithms.
Based on that, we envision various directions that are
worthwhile, including the following.
B. On Defining Realistic Threat Models
Understanding the security of machine learning algorithms
is only possible once we have a clear formulation of a threat
model (or models) outlining the capabilities and adversarial
goals. As a security community, we are very obsessed with
threat modeling, and less so for the machine learning and sys-
tems community as the community does not seem to agree on
the terms. Having those models is not an intellectual exercises,
but is of paramount importance for analysis, evaluation, and
comparison of systems. Moreover, standardized threat models
in a way would help indirectly affirm capabilities of different
systems based on the model they are analyzed within (as a
framework). A direct translation of threat models used for the
abstract analysis of machine learning algorithms is plausible
for that they are often theoretical in assuming unbounded
capabilities. Realistically defining and standardizing threat
models for machine learning systems would be a natural step
drawing on their use model.
A starting point towards this task would be by benefiting
from the existing literature on machine learning systems and
threat modeling in the adversarial machine learning commu-
nity, and by outlining – for a class of systems – capabilities of
users and adversaries, and objectives of the adversaries. Given
the decision making nature of most applications in which
machine learning is utilized, those objectives can be then
characterized, for example, as an intent to reduce confidence in
this decision, to lead to a totally wrong but arbitrary decision
(non-targeted misclassification), or to lead to a wrong decision
of a particular choice (i.e., targeted misclassification). We
note that the models, while might be general and encompass
multiple applications, the ramifications of outcome might be
application-specific. For example, with confidence reduction
being the objective of an adversary, the machine learning
model’s output might not necessarily be a wrong outcome
(e.g., imagine that the confidence of the model itself is
being used as the model outcome for classification using
thresholding). In such a case, understanding the operation of
the system will entirely change how realistic, significant, or
even meaningful is an attack of such nature.
A second but equally important space for exploration would
be capabilities associated with adversaries we will have to
subject our machine learning systems to in order to analyze
them. There has been a great deal of efforts in the learning
(theory) community in general, and by the machine learning
community in particular, in outlining capabilities into models,
including white-box, gray-box, and black-box adversaries.
Having a clear definition of those adversaries, especially in
the context of machine learning systems as they are applied
to various applications, would be essential. For example,
while the white-box attack (whereby the adversary knows
everything) and the black-box (whereby the adversary has
an oracle-access to the model) are well understood, and are
perhaps easy to translate to machine learning systems and
applications, understanding which of those models is more
relevant to a given system/application (or class of class of
them) would be very important. With the potential difficultly
of translating models across applications, it seems reasonable
to annotate those broad classes of models into a hierarchy,
and understand their relationship for different learning tasks,
as those are going to eventually be of interest to analyze and
contrast. Finally, while the gray model is perhaps figurative, it
would be perhaps worthwhile to understand the degrees of gray
associated with this model for different settings, applications,
tasks, and contexts, and the relationships between them. Those
definitions would perhaps benefit from outlining capabilities
such as direct access to models and training data, oracle (or
indirect) access to the model, and sample access (i.e., pairs
of known sample input and the corresponding output). Using
that as a broad model would a first step, but weighing in on
how relevant each model is to a given application would cer-
tainly be essential, especially given the broad set of computer
systems and applications in which they are employed.
C. Understanding the Space of Robust Machine Learning
Per Google scholar, there are more than 13,000 publications
on adversarial machine learning in 2019 alone, not to mention
that the year is not over yet (this text was written in Novem-
ber). In other words, it is not the lack of work on understanding
the robustness of machine learning algorithms, but a) that
few works exist on developing more robust machine learning
algorithms that are easy to integrate in complex systems at
reasonable cost, and b) few works that actually examine the
robustness of machine learning algorithms in context. We
highlight our concern with with both issues.
Examining machine learning algorithms in context (partic-
ularly in computer systems) is a key element that is lacking
in the literature, and we (as a community) should pay more
attention to that exploration. For example, there has been
several studies in the literature on examining the robustness
of (deep and shallow) machine learning algorithms against
adversarial examples. In the context of computer vision, an
ideal example to highlight the idea is the physical world attack
on traffic signs: it was shown to be possible to launch a
targeted attack making a detector (in a self-driving car, for
example) detect the modified stop sign as a speed limit sign
(for 45 mph) [18]. While a clever attack, highlighting the
shortcomings of deep learning networks and how easy it is
to fool them by simple modifications, would only work in
that context. In essence, the input sample from which the
deep features are extract have no other purpose than the visual
representation, recognized by a human, in a human-driven car,
or by a sensor/classifier in self-driving cars. In most other
computer systems, that is never the case: samples ingested
by the machine learning algorithms embody an application-
level and system operation logic that is often very complex,
and inducing changes in the feature space would result in
manipulating this logic. Such manipulation would essentially
pronounce those adversarial examples useless. In the context
of machine-learning based systems for anomaly detection, for
example, modifying flows arbitrarily and independently may
corrupt those flows, invaliding the key objective of the adver-
sary: misclassification while keeping the sample intact [19].
Another example arise in the context of software clas-
sification, where the objective of the adversary is to force
the machine learning algorithm to misclassify a malicious
software (malware) as a benign one, for example [20], [21],
[22]. In that context, there has been several works that
provide involved approaches for such a task. Some of those
approaches, for example, start with the feature space (a vector
representation in the frequency domain; e.g., counts of bytes,
header information, and flags), add some noise on the features,
and force the machine learning system to misclassify the
sample for which the features are extracted into malicious.
This approach indeed works, except that it makes the strong
assumption that the adversary has access to the pipeline of
the operation of the machine learning algorithm/system [23].
In other words, the approach makes the strong assumption that
the adversary will be able to inject such noise in the pipeline
at a stage between the actual input of a functional malware
(or benign) sample and the execution of the machine learning
algorithm on the abstract representation of this sample into a
feature space. This is an unrealistic assumption.
To relax this assumption, one can perhaps advocate one of
two approaches: assuming a white-box model of an attack,
one can perhaps pursue a backpropagation approach, whereby
the noise itself is backpropagated from the feature space to
the sample representation, or a forward-propagation whereby
some modifications are introduced in the sample to generate a
feature representation of interest (that is, a feature representa-
tion the results in the misclassification). While that would only
relax the attack model, again, it would not necessarily guar-
antee a functioning sample. The backpropagation approach,
although might be impractical and expensive, may as well
corrupt the sample. On the other hand, the forward propagation
approach, while could possibly result in a functioning sample,
it may not result in a misclassification (given the constraints
on the perturbation in the raw sample space).
All in all, those issues call for further investigation into new
metrics beyond misclassification, particularly metrics that are
driven from the computer system application space to explain
the results; e.g., executability, consistency, quality, etc.
III. WATCH FOR THE COMPLEXITY
As aforementioned, machine learning has been considered
as an essential component in many systems and applications
and is being considered for solving many problems. However,
complexity is an intrinsic feature of many of those machine
learning algorithms [24], making it difficult to imagine how
such algorithms would fit in such systems without interfering
with their basic properties if they could fit at all.
Model Complexity. Deep learning algorithms—such as artifi-
cial neural networks (ANN), recurrent neural networks (DNN),
long short-term memory (LSTM), and convolutional neural
networks (CNN)—are proposed to aid the security or operation
(as an optimization subsystem) of various systems, including
enterprise networks, Internet of Things (IoT) networks [25],
[26], [27], Mixed Reality (MR) systems [28], etc. Models of
those machine learning systems are determined by the number
of parameters, and are often in the order of thousands of
parameters, amounting to 1-1000 Megabyte (e.g., the size
allowed by the Amazon Machine Learning (AML) platform).
While some of those computer systems might be appropriate
for hosting those models (e.g., enterprise [29]), some others
might not. For example, such machine learning systems are
unimaginable in the context of an on-device model in a
home network system (in the IoT application). Such restriction
calls for optimizations that should take into account reducing
the complexity of models to a minimal size, and perhaps
offloading the model on a dedicated hardware, thus indirectly
increasing the complexity of the system. Introducing such
components in the system, as a necessity due to introducing
the machine learning component, would affect multiple aspects
of the system, not the least of which the attack surface.
Latency, Software, and Hardware Footprints. An additional
concern to address is how to integrate such complex machine
learning subsystems into a computer system pipeline. A ma-
jority of the literature on machine learning systems considers
those systems in isolation, assuming a straightforward inte-
gration, which is rarely the case. We believe that particular
considerations when designing machine learning techniques
for computer systems should include, among other things,
latency, software footprint, and hardware footprint.
• Latency Networked systems designs nowadays aim to
reduce latency to sub-10 millisecond margins on the
Internet, often for application constraints. For example,
in MR/VR applications, having an end-to-end latency
of more than 15 milliseconds would pronounce such
systems unusable (i.e., such a latency would result in
poor experience, causing some users dizziness). The same
phenomenon is present in multiple applications, and is not
limited to MR/VR. To ensure such an end-to-end latency,
the impact of the machine learning algorithms needs
to be minimized. It is unclear, for example, with such
large models and latency constraints, how to integrate
machine learning algorithms in certain computer systems
with such a low latency. It is our prediction that machine
learning algorithms, eventually, would not be a viable
solution for that restriction alone.
• Software and Hardware Footprint While storing the
model would not require a lot of code representation
(since using the model would be as simple as repeated
multiplication operations, for example), it is sometimes
beneficial to store the training code in the pipeline of the
machine learning subsystem, e.g., for model retraining.
Such a model, if made available in the system, needs to
be integrated with system code (e.g., network buffers in
the case of network optimization applications). Having a
complex code would potentially expose the system in its
entirety to vulnerabilities, and call for reducing the code
to the minimal functional components, while utilizing
best practices and approaches for ensuring its security and
reliability. Similarly, where hardware implementation is
pursued for implementing machine learning subsystems,
similar attention needs to be paid to how the increase in
complexity affects the operation of the overall system,
including energy consumption (see section II for more
details on how security needs to be considered as a first
citizen to reduce the cost of upgrades).
IV. ADDRESSING THE REPRODUCIBILITY CRISIS
In 2016, more than 1,500 scientists (including engineers;
https://tinyurl.com/y7bdswpj were surveyed on the repro-
ducibility of scientific work and more than 70% of them have
pointed out that they failed to reproduce another scientist’s
experiments. What is more alarming is that 52% of the
surveyed scientists pointed out that they failed to reproduce
their own work! Machine learning is no exception, either. A
recent study surveying 30 research papers on machine learning
approaches for texting mining has found that 27 (90%) of
them did not provide the raw data, 13 (43%) did not provide
sufficient details on data pre-processing, 9 (30%) did not
provide sufficient details on the feature representation and 19
(63%) did not provide sufficient details on feature selection.
Almost all of them did not provide code, 12 (40%) did not
provide algorithm details, and 15 (50%) did not provide an
executable file. All of them did not provide link to data
partitions, data indices, or seed values, while 29 (97%) of them
did not provide appropriate version of the software used. The
list goes on and on, and the state of affair in the world of the
reproducibility is quite ugly.
In major machine learning and system conferences, various
initiatives have emerged around artifacts collection and eval-
uation, whereby a committee of selected researchers is tasked
with checking the availability of artifacts, and evaluating them
as functional or reusable. Upon that, a badge of available arti-
facts, function, or reusable is assigned to the work. However,
to the best of our knowledge, those efforts are still optional,
and a small minority of authors opt-out to submitting those
artifacts. While a step in the right direction, sharing those
artifacts with the evaluating committee a) does not necessarily
mean that the results are reproducible, and b) does not mean
that the artifacts would be accessible to the community beyond
the evaluation committee or the evaluation time.
In computer systems, as highlighted earlier, reproducibility
depends on a lot of interdependent pieces, and not only the
machine learning algorithms developed for a certain task. For
example, performance evaluation and validation taking into
account model complexity, measured by the time it takes to
train or test the model, would depend on the used hardware,
optimization parameters, settings, etc., and having those “pa-
rameters” standardized would be essential. Moreover, for a
class of applications (e.g., QoS, QoE, energy optimization,
anomaly detection, etc.), having standard traces addressing
various aspects of the computer system and representative of
the various use scenarios would be essential. Data alone is
not sufficient to addressing reproducibility, but essential. Other
components include software, configurations, and libraries.
One approach to facilitating reproducibility would to share
those settings as lightweight containers or fully-fledged virtual
machines with those installed in them. It is ideal to share the
machine learning system in a form or another. For example,
when developed as a software, the code should be made
accessible, and if not accessible, perhaps a detailed description
of the main building block should be made available for
reproducibility. Even when not being able to share their code
with others for reproducing results (e.g., for intellectual prop-
erty or privacy constraints), they can still aid reproducibility
by running their code/system on standardized settings and
benchmark datasets.
We believe addressing reproducibility is in an essence a core
requirement for the sustainability of scientific endeavor, and
a close attention must be paid to facilitating this requirement
by ensuring that machine learning systems are shared in the
public space in standard format that improve reproducibility.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Machine learning systems are here to stay. They might not
be the solution to every problem in computer systems, given
the heterogeneity of those systems and their requirements, but
they promise various capabilities and optimizations in many
others, thus are beneficial. To materialize the potential of
machine learning systems, and not add to an already complex
systems space, we advocate that more effort needs to be paid
to at least three directions in the machine learning systems
community: security, complexity, and reproducibility.
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